Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, designed for firmware-oriented applications, are 64-bit Data-dependent Permutation based block ciphers with 128 key bits, which consist of 16 and 20 rounds, respectively. In this paper, we investigate their security against related-key attacks. Our investigation shows that the full 16-round Cobra-F64a can be broken by our related-key rectangle attack and that the full 20-round Cobra-F64b can be broken by our related-key differential attack.
Introduction
Recently, many Data-dependant Permutation (DDP) based block ciphers, namely SPECTR-H64 [5] , the CIKS family -CIKS-1 [18] , CIKS-128 [6] and CIKS-128H [19] , and the Cobra family -Cobra-128, Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b [8] , Cobra-H64 and Cobra-H128 [20] , have been proposed for encryption applications that require a small amount of data to be encrypted with frequently changed user keys, such as IPsec. To achieve high network speeds in such applications, these ciphers usually use agile key schedules as well as simple data transformation structures. As a result, although the proposers have considered their security against conventional cryptanalysis such as differential cryptanalysis [1] and linear cryptanalysis [17] , most of them have been shown vulnerable to related-key [2] based cryptanalytic attacks [13] [14] [15] [16] ; however, Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b [8] are two exceptions. Although their names are similar, they are quite different ciphers.
The existing cryptanalytic results on Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b are due to Lee et al. [15] , who mounted a related-key differential attack on the first 11 rounds of Cobra-F64a after exploiting a 11-round related-key differential with probability 2 −48 , and mounted a related-key differential attack on the first 18 rounds of Cobra-F64b after exploiting a 18-round related-key differential with probability 2 −56 .
In this paper, we find that there exist some shorter related-key differentials with much higher probabilities in Cobra-F64a. We construct a 15-round relatedkey rectangle distinguisher with probability 2 −123.62 in Cobra-F64a, which can be used to mount a related-key rectangle attack on the full-round Cobra-F64a. For Cobra-F64b, we exploit a 19.5-round related-key differential with probability 2 −57 , which can be used to mount a related-key differential attack on the fullround Cobra-F64b.
Like the amplified boomerang attack [11] and the rectangle attack [3] , the related-key rectangle attack [4, 9, 12] is a variant of the boomerang attack [21] . Thus, it shares the same basic idea of using two short differentials with larger probabilities instead of a long differential with a smaller probability, but requires an additional assumption that the attacker knows the specific differences between two pairs of unknown keys. This additional assumption makes it difficult or even infeasible to conduct in many cryptographic applications; however, as demonstrated in [10] , certain current real-world applications may allow for practical related-key attacks, including key-exchange protocols and hash functions.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we briefly describe the DDP-Boxes, the Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b ciphers and relatedkey rectangle attacks. In Section 3, we introduce several properties of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b. In Sections 4 and 5, we present our related-key attacks on the full-round Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b, respectively. Section 6 concludes this paper.
Preliminaries
The n × m DDP-Box F , denoted by P n/m below, uses the 2 × 1 DDP-Box P 2/1 as its elementary components. See Figure 2 
. That is, it swaps the two input bits if v = 1; otherwise, doesn't. Figure 3 in Appendix A depicts the DDP-Boxes P 32/96 and P −1 32/96 used in Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b. Because of their symmetric structure, the mutual inverses of P 32/96 and P −1 32/96 differ only in the distribution of the controlling bits over the DDP-boxes P 2/1 ; specifically, P 32/96 (·, V ) and P −1 32/96 (·, V ) are mutually inverse when V = (V 1 , V 2 , · · · , V 6 ) and V = (V 6 , V 5 , · · · , V 1 ).
The Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b Ciphers
The N -round encryption procedure of Cobra-F64a (N =16) or Cobra-F64b (N =20) can be described as follows.
1. The 64-bit plaintext P is divided into two 32-bit words (A 0 , B 0 ).
For
).
Perform final transformation:
• For Cobra-F64a: the ciphertext (C l , C r ) := (A N Q
where Crypt (e) is the round function, (Q
) is the 64-bit i-th round subkey, (Q (1,e) N +1 , Q (2,e) N +1 ) is the 64-bit subkey used in the final transformation, / denote addition/subtraction modulo 2 32 , respectively, ⊕ denotes the bitwise logical exclusive OR (XOR) operation, and e ∈ {0, 1}, with 0/1 denoting encryption/decryption, respectively. Figure 4 in Appendix A depicts Crypt (e) , where >>> i denotes right cyclic rotation by i bit positions. In addition, we assume that in an n-bit word P = (p 1 , p 2 , · · · , p n ), p 1 is the most significant bit and p n is the least significant bit. As shown in Figure 5 (b), Crypt (e) is composed of an extension transformation E, a simple transposition P (e) 96/1 and the DDP-Box P 32/96 . Given an input L = (l 1 , · · · , l 32 ), the extension 16 ) and L r = (l 17 , · · · , l 32 ). As shown in Figure 5 (a), the transposition P (e) 96/1 consists of a series of DDPs P (e) 2/1 controlled with the same bit e. Both Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b use a 128-bit user key K that is divided into four 32-bit words K = (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 ). The round subkeys (Q
), as well as the final subkey (Q (1,e) N +1 , Q (2,e) N +1 ), are generated as shown in Table 1 .
Related-Key Rectangle Attacks
Related-key rectangle attacks treat a block cipher E : {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} k → {0, 1} n as a cascade of two sub-ciphers E = E 1 • E 0 . They assume that there exist a related-key differential α → β with probability p β for E 0 (i.e. P r K,
, where ∆K 0 and ∆K 1 are two known key differences.
Two pairs of plaintexts (P 1 , P 2 = P 1 ⊕ α) and (P 3 , P 4 = P 3 ⊕ α) are called a right quartet if the following three conditions hold:
where the four unknown keys K A , K B , K C and K D satisfy K B = K A ⊕ ∆K 0 , K C = K A ⊕ ∆K 1 and K D = K C ⊕ ∆K 0 . Assuming that the intermediate values after E 0 distribute uniformly over all possible values, we get E 0 K A (P 1 ) ⊕ E 0 K C (P 3 ) = γ with probability 2 −n . Once this occurs, by C1 we know that
As a result, the probability of satisfying C3 is approximately β,γ (p β ) 2 · 2 −n · (q γ ) 2 = 2 −n · ( p · q) 2 , where p = β P r 2 (α → β) and q = γ P r 2 (γ → δ). On the other hand, for a random cipher, this probability is about 2 −2n . Therefore, if p· q > 2 −n/2 , the related-key rectangle distinguisher can distinguish between E and a random cipher. Please refer to [4, 9, 12] for illustrations.
Note that when one of the three cases ∆K 1 = ∆K 0 = 0, ∆K 0 = ∆K 1 = 0 and ∆K 0 = ∆K 1 = 0 occurs, the number of required related keys will decrease from 4 to 2. In our attacks, we use the third case ∆K 0 = ∆K 1 = 0 in which two keys K A and K B = K A ⊕ ∆K 0 are used (note K C = K B and K D = K A ). If we use N pairs of plaintexts (P i , P i = P i ⊕ α), where all P i and P i are encrypted under the key K A and the key K B , respectively, then about N 2 /2 quartets are considered for the above rectangle test. Thus, the expected number of right quartets is about
Properties of Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b
In [13, 14] , Ko et al. showed the following three properties of the DDP-Boxes P 2/1 , P 8/12 and P n/m , respectively: Property 1 Let ∆x be the difference between two inputs x and x of P 2/1 , ∆v be the difference between two control vectors v and v of P 2/1 , and ∆y be the difference between the two outputs P 2/1 (x, v) and P 2/1 (x , v ), respectively. Then,
) holds if and only if the two bits of the input
x are equal, i.e. it holds with probability
where e i denotes a n-bit word with zeros in all positions but bit
Besides, if i and j are fixed, then the trace (i.e. path) from i to j is also fixed.
Property 3 Let X and X be two inputs of P n/m , and V and V (= V ⊕ e i ) (1 ≤ i ≤ m) be two control vectors of P n/m . Then,
where Hw(·) denotes the hamming weight function.
In [15] , Lee et al. showed two properties of the DDP-Boxes P 32/96 and P 32/32 in Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b; we now describe these two properties, correcting some errors in the versions described in [15] : Property 4 Let ∆X and ∆V be the input difference and the control vector difference of P 32/96 , respectively. Then, a) P 32/96 (∆V = 0)(∆X = 0) = 0 holds with probability 1. b) P 32/96 (∆V = e 1 )(∆X = 0) = 0 holds with probability 2 −1 . c) P 32/96 (∆V = 0)(∆X = e 1 ) = e 1 holds with probability 2 −5 . d) P 32/96 (∆V = e 1 )(∆X = e 1 ) = e 1 holds with probability 2 −5 .
Property 5 Let ∆X and ∆L be input difference and control vector difference of P 32/32 , respectively. Then, a) P 32/32 (∆L = 0)(∆X = 0) = 0 holds with probability 1. b) P 32/32 (∆L = e 1 )(∆X = 0) = 0 holds with probability 2 −3 . c) P 32/32 (∆L = 0)(∆X = e 1 ) = e 1 holds with probability 2 −5 . d) P 32/32 (∆L = e 1 )(∆X = e 1 ) = e 1 holds with probability 2 −7 . e) P 32/32 (∆L = e 9 )(∆X = e 1 ) = e 1 holds with probability 2 −8 . f ) P 32/32 (∆L = e 1,9 )(∆X = e 1 ) = e 1 holds with probability 2 −10 .
, where E f denotes Round 1, E 0 denotes Rounds 2 to 9, and E 1 denotes Rounds 10 to 16 including the final transformation. Note that our full-round attack presented in this section works through the decryption process of Cobra-F64a, but for clarification, we describe our 15-round related-key rectangle distinguisher in terms of the encryption process.
A 15-Round Related-Key Rectangle Distinguisher
As shown in Table 2 , the first related-key differential we exploit for this 15round distinguisher is the 8-round related-key differential α → β with probability p = 2 −18 for Rounds 2 to 9 (E 0 ): (e 1 , 0) → (0, e 1 ), where the key difference is K A ⊕K B = K C ⊕K D = (e 1 , 0, 0, 0), and the second related-key differential is the 7-round related-key differential γ → δ with probability q = 2 −12 for Rounds 10 to 16, and the final transformation (
To compute p (defined in Section 2.3) in our attack, we need to sum the square of the probability of all differentials α → β * with the same input difference α through E 0 , which is computationally infeasible. Instead, we just count those 8-round related-key differentials α → β * in each of which only the difference propagation of the second P A,e 32/32 in Round 9 is different from the 8-round relatedkey differential α → β in Table 2 , that is, the input difference and the controlling vector difference of the second P A,e 32/32 in Round 9 is 0 and e 1 , respectively, and its 32-bit output difference t has a hamming weight of 2 with one bit difference in the first byte and the other bit in the second byte (Case A) or one bit difference in the first two bytes and the other bit in the last two bytes (Case B). The contributions of the remaining 8-round related-key differentials are negligible. We now analyze the probabilities corresponding to these two cases. Consider the second P (A,e) 32/32 in Round 9, where the controlling vector difference is e 1 and the input difference is 0. The controlling vector difference e 1 is propagated to V 1 1 , V 2 7 and V 3 13 after the extension E and the transposition P -For Case A, there exist only the following two possible sources: Table 2 . The two related-key differentials in the 15-round distinguisher in Cobra-F64a
1. The DDP-Box P 2/1 corresponding to V 3 13 produces a difference 11, and the other two DDP-Boxes P 2/1 corresponding to V 1 1 and V 2 7 produce a difference 00. From Property 1-d, this holds with a probability of 2 −1 · 2 −1 · 2 −1 = 2 −3 . Then, to get any specific difference in Case A, we have a probability of 2 −3 · 2 −3 = 2 −6 , as there are three layers of DDP-Boxes to reach each one-bit difference. As a result, the probability of getting any specific difference in Case A from this source is 2 −3 · 2 −6 = 2 −9 . 2. The DDP-Box P 2/1 corresponding to V 1 1 produces a difference 11, and the other two DDP-Boxes P 2/1 corresponding to V 2 7 and V 3 13 produce a difference 00. Again, we can learn from Property 1-d that this holds with a probability of 2 −3 . Then, since there are two traces to reach any specific difference in Case A and there are five layers of DDP-Boxes to reach each one-bit difference, we have a probability of 2 · 2 −5 · 2 −5 = 2 −9 . As a result, the probability of getting any specific difference in Case A from this source is 2 −3 · 2 −9 = 2 −12 . Finally, we can conclude from the above analysis that the probability of getting any specific difference in Case A is 2 −9 + 2 −12 .
-For Case B, there also exist only the following two possible sources:
1. The DDP-Box P 2/1 corresponding to V 2 7 produces a difference 11, and the other two DDP-Boxes P 2/1 corresponding to V 11 and V 313 produce a difference 00, which holds with a probability of 2 −1 ·2 −1 ·2 −1 = 2 −3 . Then, as there are four layers of DDP-Boxes to reach each one-bit difference of any specific difference in Case B, we have a probability of 2 −4 ·2 −4 = 2 −8 . As a result, the probability of getting any specific difference in Case B from this source is 2 −3 · 2 −8 = 2 −11 . 2. The DDP-Box P 2/1 corresponding to V 1 1 produces a difference 11, and the other two DDP-Boxes P 2/1 corresponding to V 2 7 and V 3 13 produce a difference 00, which holds with a probability of 2 −3 . Then, since there are two traces to reach any specific difference in Case B and there are five layers of DDP-Boxes to reach each one-bit difference, we have a probability of 2 · 2 −5 · 2 −5 = 2 −9 . As a result, the probability of getting any specific difference in Case B from this source is 2 −3 · 2 −9 = 2 −12 . Finally, we can conclude from the above analysis that the probability of getting any specific difference in Case B is 2 −11 + 2 −12 .
Therefore, after considering the probability 2 −3 incurred in the first P (A,e) 32/32 in Round 9, we can compute a lower bound p = {1 · (2 −18
To compute q (defined in Section 2.3), we need to sum the square of the probability of all differentials γ * → δ with the same output difference δ through E 1 , which is also computationally infeasible. Alternatively, we just count those 7-round related-key differentials γ * → δ in each of which only the difference propagation of the first P A,e 32/32 in Round 10 is different from the 7-round related-key differential γ → δ in Table 2 , that is, the output difference and the controlling vector difference of the first P A,e 32/32 in Round 10 (through the encryption direction) is 0 and e 1 , respectively, and its 32-bit input difference s has a hamming weight of 2. After noting that the two one-bit differences of such a differential can only distribute in the input to one of the three DDP-Boxes P 2/1 corresponding to V 1 1 , V 2 7 and V 3 13 , we can similarly compute a loose lower bound
1 2 ≈ 2 −11.83 for the 22 possible 7-round related-key differentials γ * → δ. As a result, the distinguisher holds probability 2 −123.62 (= 2 −64 · (2 −17.98 · 2 −11.83 ) 2 ) for a right pair, while it holds probability 2 −128 for a wrong pair.
Consequently, we can apply this distinguisher to a chosen ciphertext relatedkey rectangle attack on the full-round Cobra-F64a. Our attack procedure is as follows.
Attack Procedure
1. Choose 2 63.81 ciphertext pairs (C i ,C * i ), i = 1, · · · , 2 63.81 such that C i = C * i . Then, with a chosen ciphertext related-key attack, decrypt all C i and C * i with the user keys K A and K B to get the corresponding plaintexts P i and P * i , respectively, where K A ⊕ K B = (e 1 , 0, 0, 0). 2. Guess two 32-bit subkeys (K 1 , K 4 ) for Round 1 in E f , do the following: 2.1 Partially encrypt all the plaintexts P i with (K 1 , K 4 ) to get their intermediate values just after Round 1: we denote these encrypted values by T i . Again, partially encrypt all the plaintexts P * i with (K 1 ⊕e 1 , K 4 ) to get their intermediate values just after Round 1: we denote these encrypted values by T * i . Then, store all the values T i and T * i into a hash table.
2 If the number of the quartets passing Step 2.1 is greater than or equal to 6, then record (K 1 , K 4 ) and all the qualified (T i1 , T * i 1 , T i2 , T * i 2 ); otherwise, repeat Step 2 with another 64-bit key (K 1 , K 4 ). 2.3 Guess two 32-bit subkeys (K 2 , K 3 ) for Round 2 in E 0 , do the following:
(a) Partially encrypt all remaining quartets (T i1 , T * i1 , T i2 , T * i2 ) with (K 2 , K 3 ) to get their intermediate values just after Round 2: we denote these encrypted values by (T i1 , T * K 4 ) ).
3. For a suggested (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 ), do a trial encryption with one known plaintext/ciphertext pair. If one is suggested, output it as the user key of Cobra-F64a; otherwise, go to Step 2.
The data complexity of this attack is 2 64.81 related-key chosen ciphertexts. The required memory for this attack is dominated by the encrypted plaintext pairs (Step 2.1), which is approximately 2 64.81 · 8 = 2 67.81 memory bytes.
The time complexity of Step 1 is 2 64.81 encryptions. The time complexity of Step 2.1 is about 2 64 · 2 64.81 · 1 2 · 1 16 ≈ 2 123.81 encryptions, where 1 2 means the average fraction of 64-bit key pairs that are tested in Step 2.1. In Step 2.2, the probability that the number of the quartets for a wrong subkey is no less than 6 is approximately ) full-round encryptions in Step 2.3-(a). In Step 2.3-(b), probability 2 −6 is required to satisfy the one-round differential characteristic for Round 2, and the number of the quartets to be tested in this step is at least 6, therefore, the probability that a wrong subkey pair (K 2 , K 3 ) passes Step 2.3-(b) is about 2 −96 (= (2 −6 ) 6×2 ). As a result, the expected number of the suggested 128-bit subkeys (K 1 , K 2 , K 3 , K 4 ) in Step 2.3-(b) is 2 13.23 (= 2 45.23 · 2 64 · 2 −96 ). The time complexity for Step 3 is 2 13.23 . Therefore, this attack requires a total time complexity of 2 123.81 (≈ 2 64.81 + 2 123.81 + 2 108.65 + 2 13.23 ) encryptions.
Since the probability that a wrong 128-bit key is suggested in Step 3 is approximately 2 −64 , the expected number of suggested wrong 128-bit keys is about 2 −64 · 2 13.23 ≈ 2 −50.77 , which is quite low. Due to the probability p · q = 2 −29.81 in our attack, the expected number of quartets for the right key pair is 8 (≈ 2 126.62 · 2 −64 · (2 −29.81 ) 2 ) and the probability that the number of the quartets for the right subkey is no less than 6 is approximately
. Therefore, with a success probability of 0.8, our related-key rectangle attack can break Cobra-F64a.
Related-Key Differential Attack on Cobra-F64b

A 19.5-Round Related-Key Differential Characteristic
As shown in Table 3 , we exploit a 19.5-round related-key differential characteristic (0, e 1 ) → (e 1 , 0) with probability 2 −57 , where the key difference is (e 1 , e 1 , e 1 , e 1 ). It is derived from the full-round related-key differential characteristic presented in [15] .
In order to reduce the time complexity of our attack, we use the following filtering property: some possible differences between a pair of ciphertexts can be partially determined from the output difference (e 1 , 0) of the 19.5-round relatedkey differential, for those ciphertext pairs that do not meet these differences can be discarded immediately. More precisely, as the input difference and the controlling vector difference of the DDP-Box P (A,e) 32/32 in Round 20 are 0 and e 1 , respectively, the output difference of this P (A,e) 32/32 should have a hamming weight of 0, 2, 4 or 6, which is caused by the three inherent DDP-Boxes P 2/1 corresponding to V 11 , V 27 and V 313 . After an analysis on the P (A,e) 32/32 , we conclude Table 3 . The 19.5-round related-key differential characteristic in Cobra-F64b 14 possible values for those that have a hamming weight of 4, at most 32 2 = 31 · 2 4 possible values for those that have a hamming weight of 2, and only 1 with a hamming weight of 0. Therefore, the number of possible output differences of the P (A,e) 32/32 is totally 31·2 18 +31·2 12 +31·2 10 +2 14 +31·2 4 +1 = 8302065. After XORed with the subkey difference ∆K 3 = e 1 in the final transformation, these 8302065 possible output differences of the P (A,e) 32/32 incur 8302065 possible output differences between the right halve of the pair of ciphertexts. We denote the resultant 8302065 possible output differences by the set S. We will not count the possible number for the left halve, for it seems infeasible due to the right rotation and addition modulo 2 32 operations in Round 20.
Consequently, we can conduct the following related-key differential attack to break the full-round Cobra-F64b.
Attack Procedure
1. Choose 2 60 pairs of plaintexts (P i , P * i ) with P i ⊕ P * i = (0, e 1 ), i = 1, · · · , 2 60 . Then, with a related-key chosen plaintext attack, encrypt all P i with the user key K A to get the respective ciphertexts C i , and encrypt P * i with the related user key K B to get the respective ciphertexts C * i , where K A ⊕ K B = (e 1 , e 1 , e 1 , e 1 ). Finally, check if the right halve of the difference C i ⊕ C * i belongs to the set S defined above. If not, discard (C i , C * i ). 2. Guess two 32-bit keys K 2 and K 3 for the final transformation, do the following: Table 3 ), and the probability that a wrong subkey (K 1 , 9.98 representing the expected number of the remaining pairs. The time complexity for Step 3 is 2 74 (= 2 32 · 2 96 · 2 −53 · 1 2 ). Therefore, this attack requires a total time complexity of 2 110.67 (≈ 2 61 +2 110.67 + 2 101.66 + 2 74 ) encryptions.
Since the probability that a wrong 128-bit key is suggested in Step 3 is approximately 2 −128 , the expected number of suggested wrong 128-bit keys is about 2 −128 · 2 74 ≈ 2 −54 , which is extremely low. One the other hand, the expected number of text pairs for the right key pair is 8 (≈ 2 60 · 2 −57 ) and the probability that the number of the pairs for the right subkey is no less than 6 is approximately 2 60 i=6 ( 2 60 i · (2 −57 ) i · (1 − 2 −57 ) 2 60 −i ) ≈ 0.8. Therefore, with a success probability of 0.8, our related-key differential attack can break the full-round Cobra-F64b.
Conclusions
In this paper, we mount related-key attacks on the two DDP-based block ciphers Cobra-F64a and Cobra-F64b. The related-key rectangle attack on the full-round Cobra-F64a requires 2 64.81 related-key chosen ciphertexts and a time complexity of 2 123.81 Cobra-F64a encryptions, while the related-key differential attack on the full-round Cobra-F64b requires 2 61 related-key chosen plaintexts and a time complexity of 2 110.67 Cobra-F64b encryptions. ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? 
